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Abstract
This article seeks to enrich the normative debate on the advantages and drawbacks of direct democracy 
through an empirical analysis of individual learning about the contents of ballot propositions during cam-
paigns. Following the knowledge gap paradigm, this article examines the factors that prevent socio-eco-
nomic-knowledge inequalities among citizens from increasing. I argue that ballot propositions of low com-
plexity exert a moderating influence, since such environments provide citizens with easy learning situations. 
The empirical analysis, based on panel survey data on three federal level votes that took place in Switzerland 
from 2006 to 2008, supports the issue complexity hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
Direct democracy remains very contro-
versial. When assessing the benefits and 
shortcomings of referendums and ini-
tiatives, considerations about the com-
petence of citizens prove to be of crucial 
importance. Critics of direct legislation 
usually emphasize that citizens are not 
sufficiently qualified to directly participate 
in political decisions (see Budge, 1996, 
p. 59 ff.). From an elitist point of view, par-
ticipatory democracy in general, and di-
rect democracy in particular, is considered 
to be too demanding for ordinary citizens 
(Schumpeter, 1942). This scepticism is 
shared by many influential political theo-
rists who fear that direct democracy could 
lead to a reinvigoration of extremism. 
Dahl (1956) famously argues that extend-
ing participation rights to ordinary people 
can be dangerous, as such reforms may 
lead to increasing political activity among 
lower socio-economic classes, thus pro-
voking a rise of authoritarian ideas. In a 
similar vein, Sartori (1987, p. 120) expects 
that direct democracy “would quickly and 
disastrously founder on the reefs of cogni-
tive incompetence.” In line with such con-
cerns, early public opinion research car-
ried out in the United States in the 1950s 
and 1960s largely confirms the ignorance 
and incompetence of large parts of the 
citizenry. The paradigm of “minimalism” 
maintains that mass publics are character-
ized by low levels of political attention and 
competence (Sniderman, 1993, p. 219).
From a participatory point of view, 
however, it is believed that direct democ-
racy empowers citizens by increasing their 
political capabilities. In concert with the 
major arguments proposed by theorists 
of participatory democracy (Barber, 1984; 
Pateman, 1970), proponents of direct de-
mocracy tend to adhere to the view that the 
opportunity to participate in direct-dem-
ocratic votes leads citizens to acquire the 
necessary skills and capabilities. As a con-
sequence, this theory suggests that grant-
ing people more voice is a promising rem-
edy against the current crisis of democracy 
(Cain, Dalton, & Scarrow, 2003).
In recent years, scholars have built an 
impressive body of literature about the 
secondary effects of direct democracy. 
Overall, the empirical work suggests that 
direct democracy bolsters civic orienta-
tions (Frey, 1997). As to political knowl-
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edge, empirical studies indeed show that 
voters are generally more politically aware 
of political issues when they have a say in 
policy decision-making (Benz & Stutzer, 
2004; Smith & Tolbert, 2004; Smith & Tol-
bert, 2007; Smith, 2002).
Yet, despite these rather encouraging 
findings about the educative effects of di-
rect democracy, a major concern must be 
addressed from a normative point of view. 
While the occurrence of referendums and 
initiatives seems to increase factual knowl-
edge in political matters, these studies also 
find considerable inequalities in terms of 
the socio-economic status (SES) of voters. 
Specifically, citizens with higher levels of 
formal education have been shown to be 
more competent. In other words, political 
knowledge appears to follow a highly dis-
criminatory logic. The positive educative 
spillover effects caused by exposure to di-
rect democracy thus tend to be confined to 
people with above-average SES.
This article seeks to enrich the norma-
tive debate on the advantages and draw-
backs of direct democracy through an 
empirical analysis of individual learning 
about the contents of ballot propositions 
during campaigns. Following the knowl-
edge gap paradigm (Tichenor, Donohue, & 
Olien, 1970), I examine the conditions that 
moderate resource-based inequalities. 
Past research reveals that the effects of po-
litical communication depend on two sets 
of characteristics – the predispositions of 
individuals and the more general context 
of the political communication (Iyengar & 
Simon, 2000). In this empirical contri-
bution, I focus on the interplay between 
these two levels. My hypothesis is that 
the discriminatory effects of socio-eco-
nomic status on learning disappear when 
propositions of low issue complexity are 
at stake. The empirical part of this study 
employs panel survey data collected in 
the framework of three direct-democratic 
campaigns held in Switzerland from 2006 
and 2008. The results support the issue 
complexity hypothesis.
This article is structured as follows. 
In Section 2, I develop my theoretical ar-
gument, which culminates in the formu-
lation of my issue complexity hypothesis. 
Section 3 describes the three ballot propo-
sitions selected for this study. In Section 4, 
I provide an overview of the panel data and 
the indicators I employ. Section 5 presents 
the results through descriptive and multi-
variate analyses. Section 6 provides a con-
cise overview of this article.
2 The moderating role of  
issue complexity
Ballot propositions are simple binary 
choices where voters are able to vote “yes” 
or “no.” However, these propositions re-
late to political decisions that usually have 
important and far-reaching policy conse-
quences. Since citizens have the final say, 
it appears crucial that they are aware of the 
contents of the propositions that are sub-
mitted to the ballot. In order to arrive at a 
reasoned choice, direct democracy impos-
es high demands on citizens in terms of 
their level of issue-specific knowledge.
Some scholars suggest that voters can 
rely on shortcuts and simple cues, such 
as recommendations issued by the gov-
ernment or their preferred party when 
making their choice (Kriesi, 2005; Lupia & 
Matsusaka, 2004). This heuristic strategy 
reduces the effort necessary to make a rea-
soned choice. In a widely cited study on 
insurance propositions conducted in Cali-
fornia, Lupia (1994) shows that voters who 
rely on shortcuts tend to vote the same 
way as those who possess deep encyclo-
pedic knowledge. However, the use of this 
minimalist strategy can pose some risk to 
poorly informed citizens. Indeed, the liter-
ature on correct voting (Lau & Redlawswk, 
2008) suggests that people cannot sys-
tematically be expected to vote as if they 
had full knowledge about the propositions 
at stake. In the case of Swiss direct-dem-
ocratic votes, several empirical analyses 
reveal that citizens who lack issue-specif-
ic knowledge are less likely to vote in ac-
cordance with their own preferences than 
those who are well informed (Lanz & Nai, 
2015; Milic, 2012; Nai, 2015). It is thus ad-
vantageous for individuals if they base 
their choices on substantive consider-
ations. In order to cast a reasoned ballot, a 
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minimal level of issue-specific knowledge 
seems to be necessary.
Yet in light of their low levels of po-
litical knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter 
1996), ordinary citizens cannot general-
ly be expected to have such information 
when referendums and initiatives are 
placed on the ballot. Political communi-
cation scholars believe that the campaigns 
that precede the votes are crucial for cit-
izens’ acquisition of factual knowledge. 
Campaigns create an environment that is 
conducive to political learning by great-
ly increasing the flow of information to 
citizens (Zaller, 1992; Nadeau, Nevitte, 
Gidengil, & Blais, 2008). In the case of di-
rect democracy, competing political elites 
and the media face great incentives to 
provide citizens with a huge amount of in-
formation about the contents of the ballot 
propositions at stake (Kriesi, 2011). When 
exposed to such intensive campaigns, cit-
izens are thus expected to gain substantial 
relevant issue-specific knowledge.
However, as has long been observed, 
citizens are differently endowed with re-
sources that they can use in politics (Ver-
ba et al., 1978). This means that gains in 
knowledge may not be equally distributed 
among citizens. The influential knowledge 
gap hypothesis (Tichenor et al., 1970) pos-
its that the process of knowledge acqui-
sition of highly publicized topics diverg-
es across socio-economic strata. Based 
on the assumption that there is a gap in 
knowledge between high and low SES 
groups at the beginning, the classic hy-
pothesis expects a widening of this gap as 
a result of the flow of information provid-
ed by political actors and journalists. Sev-
eral rationales have been proposed for the 
expectation that individuals with a high 
SES tend to acquire information at a fast-
er pace than individuals with a lower SES. 
Amongst others, the former tend to pos-
sess better communication skills, higher 
levels of existing knowledge, more social 
contacts as well as greater attention to the 
mass media (Hwang & Jeong, 2009).
In the last decades, numerous pan-
el studies across a wide range of issues 
and countries have supported the knowl-
edge gap hypothesis (Bonfadelli, 1994; 
Hwang & Jeong, 2009). This empirical 
work reveals significant positive associa-
tions between education, on the one hand, 
and knowledge levels on political matters, 
on the other. However, patterns showing 
stable, and even decreasing inequalities, 
have also emerged from a non-negligible 
amount of empirical analyses. Similarly, 
Holbrook’s (2002) comprehensive study of 
six US presidential elections reveals that 
knowledge gaps do not always widen over 
the course of campaigns. The state of the 
art thus prompts the question: under what 
conditions is a broadening of knowledge 
inequalities most likely not to occur.
Hereafter, I will argue that the rela-
tionship between socio-economic status 
and issue-specific learning is moderat-
ed by the level of issue complexity. When 
faced with complex issues, it is hypothe-
sized that during political campaigns indi-
viduals with a high SES learn more about 
the issue at stake than individuals with a 
low SES. This expectation is based on the 
rationale that the appropriation of rele-
vant information is demanding in circum-
stances of high issue complexity. Thus, 
the process of knowledge acquisition may 
follow a discriminatory logic that works to 
the advantage of individuals with a high 
SES, thus leading to a widening of (pre-
sumably) existing knowledge gaps. In line 
with this consideration, Bonfadelli (2005, 
p. 44) observes that the knowledge gap 
hypothesis tends to perform particularly 
well when scholars investigate scientific, 
technological and health-related issues. 
Indeed, all of these topics can be consid-
ered to be of a rather complex nature. In 
contrast, the knowledge gap is expected 
to remain stable, or even diminish, when 
propositions of low complexity are sub-
mitted to the vote. The rationale behind 
this hypothesis is that individuals with a 
low SES will not have any major difficulties 
understanding the content of the propo-
sition. In other words, citizens find them-
selves in what Zaller (1992) calls an “easy 
learning situation.” In such as a situation, 
learning should not be systematically de-
pendent on the socio-economic status of 
individuals.
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In what follows, I propose to conceive 
of issue complexity as a three-dimension-
al phenomenon in the context of direct 
democracy. Accordingly, complex ballot 
propositions are characterized by 1) a wide 
range of issues, 2) a large number of issues 
and 3) a high degree of technical complex-
ity. Following Gormley (1986, p. 598), the 
latter means that specialized knowledge 
and training are needed if a given issue is 
to be satisfactorily addressed.
In the Swiss variant of direct democra-
cy at the federal level (see Kriesi & Trech-
sel, 2008), popular initiatives generally 
qualify as ballot propositions of low com-
plexity. These votes usually contain one 
single topic, a very restricted number of 
issues and are characterized by a low level 
of technical complexity. Popular initiatives 
are propositions “from below” and are for-
mulated by organizations that have been 
unable to channel their demands through 
legislation.
In terms of scope, the texts of initia-
tives must be thematically focused on a 
single topic. In addition, the number of is-
sues and the level of technical complexity 
tend to be low. These two features can be 
attributed to the fact that popular initia-
tives always refer to modifications to the 
constitution. This is the domain of guiding 
principles. As a consequence, the texts of 
popular initiatives are usually no longer 
than a page, given that they mostly only 
contain one or a few demands. As opposed 
to legislative bills, these demands are gen-
erally easy to understand. In other words, 
no specialized knowledge is required to 
understand the meaning of the content.
In contrast, referendums follow a re-
verse logic, since these votes deal with 
propositions “from above.” Referendums 
concern legislative bills that have been 
previously approved by Parliament. Such 
votes, therefore, constitute a final hur-
dle to be taken. Unlike initiatives, refer-
endums offer the opportunity to block a 
reform project (i. e. to defend the status 
quo). Referendums take two basic forms. 
While compulsory referendums refer to 
the constitution, optional referendums are 
subject to regular legislation. For pragmat-
ic reasons, I only assess the level of issue 
complexity in the optional referendum, 
since the cases in the empirical analysis do 
not include any mandatory referendums.1
With respect to the range of issues, 
the bills subject to optional referendums 
prove to be rather narrow in scope. The 
pieces of legislation that can be submitted 
to the vote usually focus on a particular 
topic. However, legislative bills sometimes 
contain sub-issues that are closely relat-
ed to other issue domains. Nevertheless, 
optional referendums have rather low 
levels of complexity in terms of the range 
of issues. However, this is not the case re-
garding the number of issues. Given that 
optional referendums concern legislative 
bills adopted by Parliament, these votes 
are typically characterized by a multitude 
of articles and a large number of new pol-
icy measures. Finally, the contents of op-
tional referendums are characterized by a 
high level of technical complexity. Again, 
this is can be attributed to the fact that ar-
ticles are set up at the level of regular legis-
lation, which contains detailed provisions.
To summarize, optional referendums 
tend to be much more complex than 
popular initiatives, especially in regard to 
the number of issues and their technical 
complexity. Thus, I classify the former as 
having high issue complexity and the lat-
ter as having of low issue complexity. My 
hypothesis predicts that SES-based knowl-
edge inequalities widen in the case of op-
tional referendums and remain constant 
in the case of popular initiatives.
3 Case selection
This study analyzes three direct-demo-
cratic campaigns that took place in Swit-
zerland between 2006 and 2008. Such 
campaigns typically involve a considerable 
intensification of political communication 
1 In terms of issue complexity, mandatory ref-
erendums are similar to popular initiatives. 
The fact that most votes of this type involve 
the constitutional level denotes a low num-
ber of issues and a low level of technical 
complexity. In addition, propositions use to 
be narrow in scope and thus address a very 
restricted range of issues.
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and have a limited duration of around 
two months (Kriesi 2011). As represented 
in Table 1, the selected cases vary in their 
direct-democratic institutions and their 
policy domains. Two campaigns precede 
optional referendums, while the remain-
ing one precedes a popular initiative. One 
referendum campaign and the initiative 
pertain to the domain of immigration pol-
icy. These propositions represent two cas-
es that are typical of this policy domain – a 
referendum launched by the left against 
the tightening of the asylum law and an 
initiative launched by the right in favour 
of a more restrictive naturalization policy. 
The third campaign deals with fiscal mat-
ters, specifically a neoliberal corporate tax 
reform against which the left forced a ref-
erendum. 
The remaining part of this section pro-
vides an overview of the three cases.2 The 
first campaign is related to a referendum 
against a revision of the asylum law, which 
was backed by moderate and radical right 
parties. This reform was a clear case of 
tightening, as it contained a series of re-
strictive measures towards asylum seekers. 
Immediately following the adoption by 
Parliament, parties from the left and civ-
il society groups launched a referendum 
challenge. These organizations did not 
have difficulty qualifying the legislative bill 
for the ballot. The vote was preceded by a 
long, spirited and intense campaign. On 
24 September 2006, Swiss voters accepted 
the reform of the federal asylum law by a 
large majority of 67.7 per cent.
2 Kriesi (2011) and Bernhard (2012) provide 
additional information about these cam-
paigns.
I now address the second case. In 2005, 
the radical right Swiss People’s Party (SVP) 
submitted an initiative on naturaliza-
tions, in reaction to a ruling by the Federal 
Court.3 The initiative proposed that voters 
in a given municipality be able to decide 
on the kind of procedure to adopt for nat-
uralizations – specifically on whether they 
wanted to vote on individual naturaliza-
tions at the ballot box. Moreover, the ini-
tiative stipulated that it not be possible to 
appeal the rejections of naturalization re-
quests. The campaign took place in spring 
2008 and turned out to be very heated, as 
it gave rise to opposition between two key 
figures of Swiss politics at that time – Chris-
toph Blocher, the charismatic leader of the 
Swiss People’s Party, who was surprisingly 
voted out of the government by a major-
ity of Parliament some months before, 
and Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf, his suc-
cessor as Minister of Justice, whose can-
tonal branch was excluded from the SVP 
because she accepted her replacement of 
Blocher against the will of the party. A TV 
debate on this proposition was followed 
by a record audience several weeks before 
the vote. On 1 June 2008, 63.6 per cent of 
participating voters rejected the natural-
ization initiative. 
The third selected case, the corporate 
tax reform, was designed to strengthen 
small and middle-sized firms (SMEs), 
which are often considered to be the back-
bone of the Swiss economy. The reform 
proved to be of an extraordinarily high 
level of technical complexity, including a 
tax cut on dividends for large shareholders 
and various special measures for SMEs. Af-
ter the moderate and radical right passed 
the bill in Parliament, against the votes 
of the left, the latter forced a referendum. 
During the weeks that preceded the vote, 
the Swiss business community led an in-
tensive and well-orchestrated campaign in 
support of the bill. It came as quite a sur-
prise that, on 24 February 2008, the corpo-
3 In order to avoid arbitrary decisions, the 
judges stated that rejected citizenship ap-
plications had to be justified. This decision 
de facto banned secret ballot votes. This pro-
cedure had been subject to heated criticism 
and media attention.
Table 1: Overview of the selected  
ballot  propositions
Direct-democratic 
 institution
Policy domain
Immigration policy Fiscal policy
Optional referendum Asylum law Corporation tax 
reform
Popular initiative Naturalization 
 initiative 
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rate tax reform was accepted by a narrow 
majority of only 50.5 per cent. 
4 Data and operationalization
This analysis is based on an integrated 
dataset that combines content analysis 
with panel survey data using media use 
variables (see Bernhard 2018 for a similar 
analysis). Information about the survey 
respondents’ preferred newspapers and 
political television (TV) shows allows for 
news reporting information to be included 
into the panel dataset. The latter is based 
on individual-level data collected in the 
framework of a two-wave survey conduct-
ed for each of the three campaigns in the 
German and the French language regions 
of Switzerland.4 The first waves were con-
ducted at the beginning of the campaigns 
(i. e. approximately two months before 
Ballot Day), the last waves were conducted 
immediately following the official voting 
date. I include respondents who answered 
both waves, resulting in 1092 (asylum 
law), 999 (naturalization initiative) and 
1001 (corporate tax reform) respondents. 
Three independent samples were recruit-
ed by random quota. In order to mini-
mize drop-out, the interviewees received 
an incentive for their participation. The 
samples are representative in terms of the 
respondents’ sex, age and place of resi-
dence. However, there is a bias in terms of 
education. Due to panel mortality biases, 
the lowest educational levels are under-
represented in the sample.5 Computer 
assisted telephone interviews (CATI) last-
ed about 20 to 30 minutes for each wave. 
For the content analysis, the most import-
ant quality newspapers, free newspapers, 
news magazines, regional newspapers, 
tabloid newspapers, public service TV 
news and TV shows in the German and 
4 In the case of the asylum law referendum, 
a three wave survey was conducted (Kriesi, 
2011). However, for the sake of comparability 
across campaigns, I omitted the second one.
5 The underrepresentation of the lowest edu-
cation levels does not affect the findings of 
this study.
French-speaking parts of the country were 
selected.6
The study’s indicators were construct-
ed as follows. To measure the dependent 
variable (i. e. individual level of learning 
from the beginning to the end of the se-
lected campaigns), I rely on factual knowl-
edge questions about the propositions in 
question. As opposed to general questions 
about general political knowledge, this ap-
proach is designed to capture “practical 
knowledge” (Lupia, 2006). Indeed, to reach 
a competent decision in direct-democrat-
ic votes, citizens must be informed of the 
contents of the propositions at stake. For 
each ballot proposition, respondents were 
asked three issue-specific questions.7 The 
nine items used in this analysis, as well as 
the correct answers, are listed in Table 2. 
Respondents had three response options – 
“yes,” “no” and “do not know.” For each re-
spondent, I first count the number of cor-
rect answers in both panel waves. “Do not 
know” answers were given a zero, while in-
correct answers were deducted one point. 
The rationale behind this penalization is 
that uninformed respondents who adopt-
ed guessing strategies had a 50 per cent 
probability of guessing the correct answer 
(Mondak, 2001). Overall, negative scores 
were set at zero for each wave. Hence, is-
sue-specific knowledge levels range from 
0 to 3. Subsequently, I calculate the ex-
tent of individual learning by subtracting 
the respondents’ knowledge scores in the 
first wave from the second wave. Hence, 
the learning indicator theoretically ranges 
from –3 to 3. 
Let me now turn to the independent 
variable. As is standard practice in the 
knowledge gap literature, socio-economic 
status is measured by individuals’ levels of 
formal education. I apply the classification 
used by the Swiss Federal Office of Statis-
tics regarding educational achievements. 
6 The selected media outlets are listed in Kriesi 
(2011).
7 Given that the popular initiative on natural-
izations only consisted of two demands, two 
items refer to the same issue. As demonstrat-
ed in Table 2, the first and the third question 
concern the organizational body in charge of 
naturalization decisions at the local level.
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This scale ranges from zero (“no gradua-
tion”) to 12 (“university degree”).
In addition, I include a series of con-
trol variables. Evidently, political interest is 
a “usual suspect” in the field of knowledge 
inequalities studies. For this variable, I em-
ploy a scale ranging from 1 = “not interest-
ed at all” to 4 = “very interested.” Given that 
the issue of the gender gap has proven to 
be rather salient in the scholarly literature 
(Fraile 2013; Ferrin Pereira, Fraile, & Rubal, 
2015), I also account for sex (woman = 1, 
men = 0). In addition, the effect of age is 
modelled by using the respondents’ age 
and a quadratic term in order to observe 
curvilinear patterns. Based on the tripolar 
party configuration that exists in Western 
Europe (Kriesi et al. 2008), I also consider 
individuals’ political camp by distinguish-
ing between voters from the left (Social 
Democrats and the Green Party of Switzer-
land), the moderate right (Christian Dem-
ocrats and Liberals) and the radical right 
(Swiss People’s Party). An individual’s pre-
ferred party is identified based on ques-
tions relating to voting probabilities.8 The 
responses range from “will never vote for 
this party” (score 0) to “will certainly vote 
8 A stricter definition of party identification or 
party choice in the last election or in a hy-
pothetical election next Sunday results in a 
large amount of non-responses in Switzer-
land. Partisan preferences is designated on 
the basis of a set of questions that ask re-
spondents to indicate how likely they are to 
ever vote for the five most important parties: 
the Greens, the Social Democrats, the Chris-
tian-Democrats, the Liberals and the Swiss 
People’s Party. 
for this party at some time in the future” 
(score 10). I assign respondents to a given 
camp based on the highest party score. 
Finally, I include mass media expo-
sure and attentiveness. In both cases, I 
distinguish between TV and newspapers, 
since the latter usually provides citizens 
with more elaborate information (Fraile, 
2010). However, there is an obvious lack of 
consensus as far as the appropriate mea-
surement of media exposure is concerned. 
Capturing an individual’s informational 
environment proves to be very difficult. 
Indeed, Goldstein and Freedman (2002) 
call it a vexing challenge. In line with the 
fundamental assumption that “people 
are influenced by mass communication 
in proportion to the amount of it they re-
ceive” (Zaller, 1996, p. 33), my indicator 
for media exposure corresponds to the 
respective number of arguments the re-
spondents received during the campaign 
in their preferred TV show and newspaper. 
As far as media attentiveness is concerned, 
I rely on two questions that asked respon-
dents about the extent to which they usu-
ally pay attention to TV and newspapers 
(from 1 “no attention at all” to 5 “a great 
deal of attention”). Finally, I consider the 
role played by interpersonal communica-
tion. To that end, I use the answer to an 
item that refers to the vote under scrutiny. 
Participants were asked how many times 
they had private discussions with relatives, 
friends or colleagues about the topic of the 
ballot proposition in the last few weeks. 
Again, the scale ranges from 1 “very rarely” 
to 5 “very often.”
Table 2: Issue-specific knowledge questions according to ballot proposition
Campaign Question Correct 
answer
Asylum 1) Does the law stipulate that asylum-seekers have to possess identity papers in order to apply for asylum? No
2) Does the law allow excluding rejected asylum-seekers from social assistance? Yes
3) Does the law in principle allow accepting demands of asylum-seekers who can return to a safe third country? No
Naturalization 1) Does the initiative demand that only the people will decide on naturalization requests in the future? No
2) Does the initiative interdict that decisions on naturalizations can be contested before Court? Yes
3) Does the initiative leave it to the communes to choose the body in charge of naturalization decisions? Yes
Corporate tax 1) Does the reform provide tax reliefs for all kind of dividends? No
2) Does the reform allow for alleviating the firms’ tax on capital at the cantonal level? Yes
3) Does the reform introduce fiscal measures for personal companies in a period of transition? Yes
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5 Empirical analysis
The analysis is carried out in two steps. 
First, I resort to descriptive analyses in 
which I outline the knowledge levels and 
the magnitude of learning for each of the 
three selected campaigns. Second, I turn 
to the multivariate analysis by testing the 
issue complexity hypothesis.
5.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 3 provides an overview of individuals’ 
knowledge levels at the outset of the three 
campaigns and at their ends. The highest 
level of initial knowledge is observed for 
the asylum law (0.70). In contrast, this fig-
ure proves to be much lower for the two re-
maining cases (0.28 for the naturalization 
initiative and 0.23 for the corporate tax 
reform). This sharp difference can be at-
tributed to the fact that an unusually high 
number of media reports were published 
about the asylum law before the campaign 
entered into its hot phase in the last few 
weeks. Thus, many voters were familiar 
with the proposition’s content when the 
first wave of the panel survey took place. 
At the end of this campaign, respondents 
remained most knowledgeable about the 
asylum law (1.52), followed by the natural-
ization initiative (1.05), and the corporate 
tax reform (0.87). The intermediate po-
sition of the campaign on naturalization 
is somewhat surprising. Given that this 
proposal was characterized by a low level 
of issue complexity, citizen competence 
should have been highest in this case. A 
closer look reveals that respondents had a 
difficult time correctly answering the first 
knowledge question (see Table 2). Indeed, 
it is striking to observe how knowledge lev-
els with respect to this item even slightly 
decreased.9
More generally, it appears that learn-
ing occurred during these campaigns. In 
terms of magnitude, there are no large 
differences across the three cases under 
scrutiny (+0.82 for the asylum law, +0.76 
for the naturalization initiative and +0.64 
for the corporate tax reform). It can thus 
be asserted that respondents learnt a great 
9 Among the nine knowledge items studied, 
this negative difference is an exception.
deal about the issue-specific provisions 
of the ballot propositions. It is important 
to note that the amount of issue-specific 
learning is highest in the case of the nat-
uralization initiative when the item that 
caused a lot of confusion among respon-
dents is removed. Many citizens believed 
that the initiative demanded that citizens 
should decide on naturalization requests 
(by means of ballot votes at the local lev-
el). In fact, the initiative was much less 
constraining: the text stipulated that mu-
nicipalities should be free to decide on the 
kind of procedures that they would like to 
apply. Finally, the comparatively low lev-
els of both initial knowledge levels and 
learning in the corporate tax reform case 
are consistent in light of its extraordinarily 
high level of complexity.
5.2 Multivariate analysis
Before addressing my hypothesis, I will 
briefly present the determinants of initial 
knowledge levels. The ordered probit re-
gression models (in the Appendix to this 
article) contain the independent variables 
outlined in the previous section, with the 
exception of campaign-specific factors 
(i. e. the two indicators on exposure and 
the item about interpersonal discussions). 
As demonstrated in Table A.1, the level of 
formal education is only significant for 
the case of the asylum law. Remarkably, 
education-based inequalities are unable 
to explain individual levels of issue-spe-
cific knowledge at the outset of the cam-
paigns for the naturalization initiative and 
the corporate tax reform. These findings 
call into question the basic assumption of 
the knowledge gap paradigm. In contrast, 
initial knowledge is found to depend pos-
itively on levels of political interest. This 
Table 3: Issue-specific knowledge levels and 
learning, by campaign
Knowledge level 
and level of 
learning
Asylum Naturalization Corporate tax
Knowledge (t1) 0.70 0.28 0.23
Knowledge (t2) 1.52 1.05 0.87
Learning +0.82 +0.76 +0.64
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relationship proves to be significant in all 
three campaigns. In addition, the analysis 
reveals that voters from the left were most 
knowledgeable about the ballot measure 
on asylum policies. This result can be 
attributed to the strong public involve-
ment of the left and their allies during the 
pre-campaign period, since these actors 
did not interrupt their mobilization efforts 
after having collected the required num-
ber of signatures (Bernhard 2012).
In the case of issue-specific learning, 
I make two important decisions in order 
to deal with the challenge posed by ceiling 
effects. First, I omit individuals from the 
analysis who provided correct answers to 
all three questions in the first wave sur-
vey, since these respondents are unable to 
acquire additional knowledge.10 Second, 
I decide to account for initial knowledge 
levels. The rationale behind this choice is 
that it is expected that learning potentials 
should be largest for respondents who are 
not knowledgeable at the beginning of the 
campaigns. In other words, individuals 
who are already knowledgeable about the 
issues at stake before the beginning of the 
campaign cannot learn much afterwards.
Consistent with this line of reasoning, 
Table 4 shows that there is a strong nega-
tive association between initial knowledge 
levels and the magnitude of issue-specific 
learning during all three campaigns. With 
respect to formal education, the findings 
are in line with my hypothesis. According 
to the estimation models, there are signif-
icant education-based disparities in terms 
of issue-specific learning regarding the 
two optional referendums, i. e. the asylum 
law and the corporate tax reform. In con-
trast, the coefficient for the popular initia-
tive on naturalizations is not statistically 
significant. These results support the view 
that learning follows a resource-based log-
ic when ballot propositions of high com-
plexity are at stake. On the contrary, in the 
case of popular initiatives, citizens find 
themselves in easy learning situations. 
As a consequence, when confronted with 
10 This affected 139 respondents in the case of 
the asylum law, 39 respondents in the case of 
the naturalization initiative and 34 respon-
dents in the case of the corporate tax reform.
these kinds of ballot propositions, individ-
uals with low levels of formal education 
do not tend to learn more from the cam-
paigns than those with lower levels.
With respect to the control variables, 
the level of an individual’s political in-
terest only appears to be instrumental to 
learning in the case of the corporate tax 
reform. This positive relation may be due 
to the high technical complexity of this 
proposition. In such a difficult learning 
situation, individuals with high political 
interest may be much more motivated 
than the remaining individuals to acquire 
issue-specific knowledge. Regarding the 
vote on naturalization, there are two sig-
nificant associations. First, women turn 
out to have learnt less than men, a find-
ing that has no satisfactory explanation. 
Unquestionably, the domain of political 
rights (including questions pertaining to 
naturalizations) has historically been a 
men’s affair in Switzerland. However, the 
absence of a gender gap at the outset of 
the campaign seems to somewhat cancel 
out this line of reasoning. Second, it is in-
teresting to note that exposure to TV leads 
to greater issue-specific knowledge during 
this campaign. As mentioned in the sec-
tion on case selection, it is precisely in the 
case of the naturalization initiative that TV 
shows play an important role. Regarding 
the asylum law, voters from the radical 
right have learnt significantly less than the 
voters from the left and the moderate right. 
It may be possible that most adherents of 
the Swiss People’s Party did not consider it 
necessary to grapple with the proposition’s 
content because simply knowing that the 
revised asylum law contained tightening 
measures may have reassured them that 
they were consistently voting with their 
pre dispositions. 
Regarding the control variables, I 
have to admit that I accounted for the 
determinants which are generally used in 
the knowledge literature. A reviewer con-
vincingly observed that those variables 
which can be expected to causally follow 
the independent variable (i. e. educa-
tion) should be dropped in order to avoid 
post-treatment biases. Based on these 
considerations, I decided to rely on alter-
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native specifications by removing political 
interest, camp affiliations, media expo-
sure, media attention, and interpersonal 
discussions from the models presented in 
Table 4. In so doing, I obtained the same 
results in terms of statistical significance 
for the remaining variables.
Due to another sensible remark made 
by a reviewer, I also tested the issue com-
plexity hypothesis in a single model. To 
that end, I merged the three campaign 
data sets. As explanatory factors, I intro-
duced – in addition to the variables listed 
in Table 4 – a dummy variable for optional 
referendums (i. e. “1” for the asylum law 
and corporate tax reform and “0” for the 
initiative on naturalizations) as well as an 
interaction term between formal educa-
tion levels and optional referendums. The 
latter turns out to be positively significant 
at the 5 per cent error level. Hence, formal 
education appears to be instrumental for 
issues-specific learning when individuals 
face optional referendums. This finding is 
in line with my hypothesis.
6 Conclusion
The question of the relative merits of direct 
democracy over representative democracy 
has long given rise to an insurmountable 
divide between proponents and oppo-
nents of extended popular rights. While 
the former emphasize that the use of ref-
erendums and initiatives empower citi-
zens, the latter argue that ordinary voters 
lack the ability to make reasoned choices 
on ballot propositions. In the last decades, 
Table 4: Ordered probit regression models explaining levels of issue-specific learning
Variables Asylum 
(1)
Naturalization 
(2)
Corporate tax 
(3)
Initial knowledge –0.595***
(–10.80)
–0.634***
(–7.72)
–0.685***
(–9.51)
Education level 0.049***
(3.67)
0.019
(1.38)
0.033**
(2.70)
Political interest 0.065
(1.08)
0.096
(1.68)
0.208***
(3.77)
Woman 0.043
(0.55)
–0.194*
(–2.41)
–0.066
(–0.85)
Age –0.025
(–1.92)
–0.005
(–0.37)
0.012
(0.89)
Age2 0.0001
(1.17)
0.0000
(0.23)
–0.0001
(–0.41)
Left 0.346***
(3.72)
0.054
(0.60)
–0.154
(–1.71)
Moderate right 0.225*
(2.41)
0.019
(0.19)
–0.009
(–0.09)
TV exposure –0.000
(–0.01)
0.002*
(2.43)
0.001
(1.09)
Newspaper exposure –0.000
(–0.27)
–0.000
(–0.88)
0.000
(0.81)
TV attention –0.239
(–1.81)
0.179
(1.26)
0.064
(0.45)
Newspaper attention 0.042
(0.33)
–0.093
(–0.73)
–0.101
(–0.78)
Interpersonal discussions 0.127
(0.88)
0.024
(0.16)
0.121
(0.82)
N 897 951 954
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.046 0.055
Note. Z-Values in parentheses. 
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.
Supporters of the radical right serve as reference category for the political camp.
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this controversy has been nurtured by a 
vast amount of empirical studies.
In this article, I focus on factual knowl-
edge gains during direct-democratic cam-
paigns. More specifically, the present con-
tribution examines the moderating role 
played by issue complexity in regard to the 
relationship between education-based in-
equalities and learning about the content 
of ballot propositions. Based on survey 
panel data available for three Swiss di-
rect-democratic campaigns on the topics 
of asylum, naturalizations and corporate 
taxes, the results suggest that issue-spe-
cific learning is positively related to an in-
dividual’s level of formal education when 
complex ballot propositions are at stake 
(i. e. optional referendums). Conversely, 
learning does not prove to be discrimina-
tory when proposals of low issue complex-
ity (i. e. popular initiatives) are submitted 
to the vote.
Arguably, the most interesting by- 
product of this empirical analysis con-
cerns the finding that levels of knowledge 
at the outset of campaigns are not always 
a function of formal education. Only in the 
case of the asylum law do the results re-
veal education-based inequalities in citi-
zens’ initial levels of knowledge. Moreover, 
this knowledge gap tends to be reinforced 
during this particular campaign. The natu-
ralization initiative constitutes a contrast-
ing case. The absence of both knowledge 
gaps and unequal learning patterns sheds 
a positive light on this campaign. The cor-
porate tax reform is an ambivalent case. 
While there was no knowledge gap at the 
beginning of the campaign, formal educa-
tion plays a major role in the acquisition of 
issue-specific knowledge.
I would like to emphasize that I am 
somewhat reluctant to generalize the find-
ings obtained in the framework of this 
study. First, and most obviously, this re-
search has only dealt with three campaign 
contexts. This limited number causes 
some apprehension about the general va-
lidity of the results presented here. Second, 
Swiss direct-democratic campaigns take 
place against the backdrop of a peculiar 
and well-structured context, characterized 
by rather intensive campaigns. This may 
strongly limit the external validity of the 
results of the empirical analysis. Thus, the 
number of campaigns and countries in fu-
ture empirical studies should be increased. 
However, this requires a substantial effort 
given that the use of panel surveys seems 
to be the appropriate method for convinc-
ingly detecting possible campaign effects.
From a normative point of view, this 
study paints a rather ambivalent picture. 
On the one hand, I show that individuals 
learn a great deal about the contents of 
propositions in the case of intensive cam-
paigns. This basic pattern lends support to 
advocates of direct democracy, as it illus-
trates that the possibility of participating 
in decision-making can motivate people 
to become involved in political issues. On 
the other hand, I establish that citizens 
with lower levels of education face sig-
nificantly greater difficulties in acquiring 
issue-specific knowledge than those with 
higher levels of education when complex 
propositions are at stake. This finding 
yields some support to critics of direct de-
mocracy who maintain that referendums 
and initiatives are too demanding for or-
dinary citizens. However, instead of throw-
ing the baby out with the bath water and 
abandoning direct legislation altogether, it 
may be worth considering the implemen-
tation of specific provisions that could fa-
cilitate issue-specific learning by citizens 
with lower levels of education. These may 
include investments in political education 
by means of target group-oriented courses 
and accessible voting applications about 
the issues at stake.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Ordered probit regression models explaining initial knowledge levels
Variables Asylum 
(1)
Naturalization 
(2)
Corporate tax 
(3)
Education level 0.041***
(3.49)
0.004
(0.31)
0.008
(0.60)
Political interest 0.353***
(6.51)
0.129*
(2.24)
0.246***
(4.27)
Woman –0.049
(–0.68)
0.061
(0.74)
–0.127
(–1.55)
Age 0.018
(1.45)
–0.018
(–1.21)
–0.012
(–0.86)
Age2 –0.0002
(–1.55)
0.0002
(1.47)
0.0002
(1.38)
Left 0.199*
(2.36)
–0.105
(–1.12)
0.056
(0.59)
Moderate right 0.018
(0.21)
–0.083
(–0.80)
0.140
(1.39)
TV attention 0.011
(0.09)
0.068
(0.47)
0.025
(0.17)
Newspaper attention 0.028
(0.24)
0.083
(–0.73)
–0.153
(–1.14)
N 1035 990 990
Pseudo R2 0.033 0.008 0.025
Note. Z-Values in parentheses.
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.
Supporters of the radical right serve as reference category for the political camp.
